P(doom) estimates from AI researchers span approximately six orders of magnitude — from Yann LeCun's under 1% to Eliezer Yudkowsky's over 95%. This enormous range reflects genuine, substantive disagreement about the future of AI and the difficulty of the alignment problem. Understanding why experts disagree is essential for anyone trying to form their own view of AI existential risk.

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Expert Estimates Overview

Here are prominent public estimates from leading AI researchers and industry figures:

Jensen HuangNVIDIA CEO
~0%Low
Answered "zero" when asked for his P(doom) (Sep 2026)
Yann LeCunMeta AI
<1%Low
Believes current architectures incapable of existential risk
Andrew NgDeepLearning.AI
~1%Low
Views AI risk as overblown compared to other risks
Sam AltmanOpenAI CEO
~1%Low
Publicly stated "low but non-zero"; evasive on a precise number
Geoffrey HintonNobel 2024
10–20%Moderate
Extinction risk over 30 years; has said up to 50% in some interviews
Dario AmodeiAnthropic CEO
10–25%Moderate
Focuses on catastrophic rather than existential risk; recently stated ~25% chance things go "really, really badly"
Evan HubingerAnthropic Alignment
>10%Moderate
Personal estimate: extinction "within the next decade" (Axios, Sep 2026)
Yoshua BengioMila
~20%Moderate
Based on 50% AGI probability × 40% alignment failure
Stuart RussellUC Berkeley
~20%Moderate
Regards risk as serious and motivating; no precise public number
Nick BostromOxford FHI
~30%High
Author of "Superintelligence"; no precise public estimate
Paul ChristianoARC
~50%High
Former OpenAI alignment researcher; high risk from misalignment
Eliezer YudkowskyMIRI
>95%Very high
Most pessimistic prominent voice; believes alignment nearly impossible
Roman YampolskiyUniv. of Louisville
~99.9%Very high
Argues safe superintelligence is impossible to verify; viral interview figure
Max TegmarkMIT / FLI
>90%Very high
Published his estimate on X, April 2025

The AI Impacts Expert Survey (ESPAI)

The most systematic data comes from AI Impacts' Expert Survey on Progress in AI. The latest iteration — ESPAI 2024, fielded December 2024 across 1,580 international AI researchers and published September 2026 — found:

  • Median P(extinction or permanent severe disempowerment): 10% — double the 5% median of the previous survey
  • Mean: 18%
  • 51% of researchers assigned at least a 10% probability
  • 72% believe AI-risk-minimization research should be prioritised more

This survey is often cited as the closest thing to an "expert consensus" — but the spread between median and mean, and the doubling of the median between iterations, shows that expert views remain unsettled and have moved upward.

Why Experts Disagree

The enormous spread in estimates is not random — it reflects systematic disagreement about specific questions:

1. AGI Timelines

When will transformative AI arrive? Optimists (often with lower P(doom)) expect longer timelines (50+ years), giving more time to solve alignment. Pessimists expect shorter timelines (5-15 years), leaving insufficient time for safety work. The ESPAI 2024 survey found the median forecast for high-level machine intelligence had moved forward to ~2047 — and individual estimates still ranged from never to within a decade.

Why P(doom) Went Mainstream in 2025–2026

Two developments pushed P(doom) from an insider metric into public discussion. First, Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares' 2025 book If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies — a New York Times bestseller — gave the 95%+ worldview mass-market exposure. Second, September 2026 brought the topic to front pages: researcher Jacob Coxon resigned accusing frontier labs of "playing with our lives," Anthropic's head of alignment Evan Hubinger publicly gave his estimate as ">10% within the next decade," and NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang countered with "zero." In Silicon Valley, stating one's personal P(doom) at dinners and on panels has become a shorthand for where someone stands on AI risk — much like stating one's position on crypto or longevity once was.

2. Alignment Difficulty

Is alignment a solvable engineering problem (LeCun's view) or a fundamentally hard theoretical problem (Yudkowsky's view)? This is perhaps the core disagreement. Those who view alignment as tractable tend to have lower P(doom); those who view it as extremely difficult tend to have higher P(doom). Recent progress in RLHF and Constitutional AI has moved some estimates downward, but skeptics argue these methods won't scale to superintelligence.

3. Capability Jump

Will AI capabilities increase gradually (allowing course correction) or suddenly (removing time to respond)? Gradualists argue we'll have warning signs and time to adapt. Sudden-jump theorists worry about "intelligence explosion" scenarios where AI self-improvement rapidly outpaces human response.

4. Societal Response

Will international coordination succeed? Will competitive pressure override safety investment? Optimists about governance tend to have lower P(doom); pessimists about race dynamics tend to have higher P(doom). The current competitive landscape between major AI labs and nations is a significant concern for many researchers.

5. Definition of "Doom"

Experts use different definitions. Some define doom as literal human extinction; others include civilisational collapse, permanent loss of autonomy, or "any outcome significantly worse than a good future." Broader definitions naturally produce higher estimates.

Calculate Your Own P(doom)

Our P(doom) Calculator lets you explore how changing your assumptions about these key variables affects the combined probability estimate. It's a useful tool for stress-testing your intuitions about AI risk and understanding how different experts might arrive at their estimates.

P(doom) Calculator

Adjust probability inputs for alignment failure, misuse risk, timeline, and societal response. Explore how your assumptions combine into a composite estimate.

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Further Reading